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Justice Brennan's Supreme Court tenure is
commonly divided into two stages.' The early
stage was marked by his opinions written for the
"activist" Warren Court while the later stage is
remembered by his authoring numerous dissents
2
during the time of a more "conservative" Court.
While a somewhat useful analytical tool, this distinction has a tendency to produce a caricature of
a Justice whose power (or lack of it) rested on
fluctuating circumstances. In reality, Justice Brennan's enduring influence is the product of legal
acuity combined with untarnished personal integrity.
It would be a mistake to force Justice Brennan's
thirty-four years on the Supreme Court 3 into a single strain of thought. 4 This tribute by the CommLaw Conspectus, however, provides the opportunity to view Justice Brennan's legacy in light of his
constitutional and personal views on communications. Constitutionally, justice Brennan believed
in the power of dialogue to enhance democracy
and hence, he was the staunchest defender of the
freedom to speak. 5 Personally, Justice Brennan

modeled his own communication on the pillars of
rationality and civility.6
Justice Brennan's communications jurisprudence is based on the notion that the powerless or
unpopular person in civil society should never be
kept out of the democratic process through
forced silence. Alternatively, it is proper to assert
that, according to Justice Brennan, the person
with the power of speech is never powerless in our
democracy. Three decisions written by Justice
Brennan manifest this principle brilliantly.
In NAACP v. Button, the Court held unconstitutional Virginia's prohibition of the NAACP's practice of soliciting plaintiffs for desegregation cases
on the ground that such solicitation Was protected
as an exercise of political expression and right of
association. 7 The facts and underlying history of
the case were simple. In the tumultuous years following the watershed Brown v. Board of Education,8
potential desegregation plaintiffs were oftentimes
justifiably afraid to come forward and speak, while
segregated states such as Virginia used their legis-
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ing social importance" should be withdrawn for its inability

I See generally Harry A. Blackmun, A Tribute to Mr. Justice
Brennan, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (Winter, 1991);

Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William Brennan, Jr.,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1 (Nov., 1990).
2 This distinction has become accepted legal dogma to
the point that legal scholars may feel the need to refer the
"early" or "later" Brennan as one might refer to the early or
later Wittgenstein.
3 Justice Brennan's official period of Supreme Court service ran from October 16, 1956 to July 20, 1990.
4
Indeed, aside from the difficulty of synthesizing the
myriad of legal issues with which Justice Brennan dealt, a biographer would be forced to account for the instances when
the Justice admitted to failings in his earlier thought. For
example, in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 84 (1973), he concluded that his previous definition
of "obscenity"-outlined in the Court's Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957), decision-as "material which appeals to

to "reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level."
5 Indeed, I think thatJustice Brennan was genuinely excited by the Court's ability to assure to all within society the

right to speak freely. Only five years ago, when he wrote to
congratulate this Journal on the publication of its first issue,
he wrote: "The introduction of a new scholarly law journal

devoted to communications law is in occasion to cheer." William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks, 1 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1
(1993).
6 As the reader will see, the comparison of Justice Brennan's constitutional and personal approach to communications will put to bed the notion that his legal writings were
informed primarily by his personal "agenda." Because, while
Justice Brennan firmly held that "offensive" speech could
still be constitutionally protected, his own approach to speaking and writing provided a model of civility in discourse.
See generally 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8 See generally 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
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lative power to silence those who were not afraid
to speak.
Justice Brennan provided two answers to Virginia's contention that the NAACP's "solicitation"
of plaintiffs was wholly outside First Amendment
protection. "The first is that a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere
labels. The second is that abstract discussion is
not the only species of communication which the
Constitution protects; the First Amendment also
protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful
ends, against governmental intrusion." This is
classic Brennan-brief, forceful and elegant. The
first answer asserts that state legislation cannot
win simply by begging the constitutional question.
The second answer combines an analysis of motive with the content of speech in order to decide
the legitimacy of the state's objection.1 0
Unlike NAACP v. Button, Goldbergv. Kelly'1 is not
a First Amendment case since the major issue was
couched in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim. In Goldberg, Justice Brennan
wrote for the Court in holding that welfare benefits were property within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and as
such, could not be revoked in the absence of an
evidentiary hearing-prior to the termination of
benefits-in which the welfare recipient had the
option to participate.
Although Goldberg is remembered for its novel
understanding of the property claim, the beauty
of the case may be found at a more basic level. In
Justice Brennan's understanding, the welfare recipient-often uneducated, probably poor, sometimes simply down on his or her luck-has the
right to be heard before the state takes action so
that his or her speech may be considered in the
decision-making process.
Texas v. Johnson12 is, in many ways, the quintessential freedom to speak case even though its subject of flag-burning is a non-verbal form of communication. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court
in a 5-to-4 decision which held that the government's interest in preventing flag desecration was

an impermissible content-based restriction on the
freedom of speech.
Justice Brennan noted the "bedrock" First
Amendment principle that "the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."1 3 Moreover, he acknowledged the historic principle that a primary "function of free
speech under our system of government is to in14
vite dispute."
The crux of the opinion, however, turned once
again to the notion of motive for behavior as opposed to the behavior itself. The State of Texas,
which criminally prosecuted Johnson for burning
a flag at the 1984 Republican National Convention, did not maintain that flag-burning per se was
criminal, since the preferred method of disposing
of torn or dirty flags is by burning. 15 Rather, the
state maintained that the motive for burning the
flag, viz., to make a political statement offensive to
some, was criminal.' 6 Justice Brennan asserted
that to accept the state's argument on the issue of
motive would be to permit the state to "prescribe

371 U.S. at 429.
This second answer will resurface in a discussion of
New York Times v. Sullivan, infra.
11 See generally 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12
See generally 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

See id. at 401.
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18 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418.
19 The case provides an excellent example of the reductio
ad absurdum argument. If the minority's opinion is accepted
(viz., that unpopular and offensive speech may be justifiably
squelched) and we add the (true) premise that the minority's
understanding is offensive (in the majority's opinion) to the
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The fascinating aspect of the Johnson decision is
in the application of its principles to the disagreement between the majority and the dissenters on
the Court. While the dissenters found the Court's
decision to be an abomination to the flag, Justice
Brennan asserted that "the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our
decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of
freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of
criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of
our strength."' 8 While the principles of Justice
Brennan's decision would consistently allow an
opposing opinion to exist unfettered by the threat
of criminal repercussions, it is uncertain that the
dissenting opinions could be freely voiced if their
reasoning was followed since they are 1) minority
views and 2) arguably offensive to the principles
of the flag championed by the majority.1 9
16

17
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These three cases provide an accurate, albeit
limited, portrayal of Justice Brennan's defense of
the freedom to speak in the face of attempted
governmental suppression. It was a libel case,
however, that provided perhaps the finest example of Justice Brennan's commitment to the freedom to speak in opposition to those in power.
New York .Times Co. v. Sullivan was a quasi-governmental suppression of speech case couched in
a civil libel suit.2 0

Sullivan, a Montgomery, Ala-

bama, City Commissioner, brought suit against
four African-American clergymen and the New
York Times for an admittedly inaccurate advertisement appearing in the Times which was paid for by
the clergymen in order to solicit funds to support
civil rights activities. 2 1 The flavor of the case was
likened to sedition since the inaccurate comments were directed toward government agencies
under Sullivan's direction, not toward Sullivan
himself. 22 The trial jury was instructed to find for
Sullivan as a "public official" if the inaccurate
statements 2 3 in question reflected negatively on
the agencies under his direction. 24 The jury returned a verdict for Sullivan which was affirmed
25
by the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Echoing his previous opinion in NAACP v. Button, Justice Brennan maintained that the Supreme
Court would not turn a blind eye to First Amendment principles solely because the Alabama
courts asserted that the Constitution did not protect libelous statements. Rather, he asserted that
in "deciding the question now, we are compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other

truth from the speaking citizenry would be tantamount to a chilling of political expression, Justice
Brennan stated that a "rule compelling the critic
of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel
judgments virtually unlimited in amount leads
to... 'self-censorship.' "2 7 This line of reasoning
led to the now famous constitutional test requiring "public" persons to prove that a statement was
made with actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsity
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
28
or not, in order to prove libel.
Justice Brennan's communications jurisprudence reflects a healthy skepticism of governmental authority. He possessed a "show me, don't tell
me in conclusory terms" attitude. It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that his personal demeanor reflected a style of persuasion and civility as opposed to heavy-handedness.
I served Justice Brennan as a law clerk during
the 1974 Term. I entered the Brennan chambers
struck and impressed by the dominance of his
legal thinking. By that time, he had already authored NAACP v. Button, Goldberg v. Kelly and New
York Times v. Sullivan in addition to the landmark
Baker v. Car,29 Katzenbach v. Morgan,3° Green v.
County School Board,3 1 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents.

32

Arguing the maxim that a demand of absolute

Yet, as I worked with Justice Brennan, I found
that I was as much or more impressed with the
man than the judge. Obviously, this in no way discounts the judge; he will easily stand as one of the
five greatest Justices in the Court's history.
Rather, it is to give special honor to the man.
In reviewing the Brennan corpus while preparing this tribute, I read a 1962 volume of the Catho-

principles that the flag represents, then by the minority's
own reasoning, its opinion may be justifiably squelched.
The minority did not doubt the power ofJustice Brennan's
logic. Indeed, one of the majority's dissents began with the
quote, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." Id. at
421 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
20
See generally 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21
See id. at 256.
22
See id.
23
Some of the inaccuracies were innocuous (AfricanAmerican students sang the National Anthem, not "My Country, 'Tis of Thee'", id. at 258-59) while others were more inflammatory (police were present in large numbers on Alabama State College Campus, but did not "ring" the campus,
id. at 259).
24
See id. at 256.

Id. at 279.
See id. at 279-80.
See generally 369 U.S. 196 (1962) (allowing equal pro29
tection challenges to state apportionment of legislative districts and opening the door to judicial reapportionment according to one-person, one-vote guidelines).
30
See generally 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that Congress may create remedies to protect constitutional rights,
such as the Voting Rights Act's prohibition of English literacy
tests as prerequisites to voter registration, even when the
Supreme Court had not required such protection).
31
See generally 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating "freedom-of-choice" school desegregation plan and requiring implementation of race-conscious pupil assignment)..
32
See generally 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing implied
private right of action for damages for violations of constitu-
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tional rights committed by federal agents).
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lic University Law Review, which was devoted to the
work of Justice Brennan during his first five years
on the Supreme Court. As history, the volume is
interesting for a variety of reasons, but most specifically for one author's 33 portrayal of the young
Justice. The portrayal, entitled The Common Sense
of Mr.Justice Brennan,34 describes him as the voice
of reason between the, "liberal" Justice Black and
the "conservative" Justice Frankfurter. He is described as "conciliatory and moderate," with a "negotiator's manner." 35 Indeed, 36 years later, the
author's descriptions of the Brennan style and the
Brennan opinion remain valid:
The distinguishing quality of Brennan's pattern of
thought is what may be called massive common sense.
His approach to every case is practical, specific, factual.
Unlike Black or Frankfurter, he rarely lays down sweeping dicta. He gives the impression of reasoning inductively from the facts before him rather than deductively
from his own set of first principles. This, in turn, accounts for the characteristic tone of his opinions.
While some of his colleagues give the impression of
writing for posterity rather than any present audience,
Brennan invariably addresses himself to his brethren
on the Court and his professional colleagues in the law.
He is conciliatory and moderate. His is the negotiator's
manner; one catches in his opinions the overtones of
the conference room mediator and the earnest debater, seeking to persuade rather than overpower.
Those overtones are missing in the opinions of several
of his colleagues. Brennan is neither prophet nor professor nor publicist. His tone is that of the practical
man who, even when most deeply convinced of the
rightness of his own position, does not wholly forget
that one or another of his colleagues who differs with
him today may join him in making a different majority
tomorrow. This is not to suggest that there is anything
weakly placating or self-deprecatory in Brennan's work;
he has at his command a resource of lucid, sturdy
prose. But he foregoes the witticism, the epigram, the
twisting personal thrust, if, indeed, these literary devices occur to him; and although he occasionally rises
to indignation, it is an impersonal kind of indignation,
and his language is characteristically calm and goodhumored. One does not turn to Brennan's opinion's
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to enjoy their high style, discursive erudition, or the
working out of an iron logic, but one does find in them
a body of reasonable argument reflecting a 3patient
6
open-mindedness and a decent, humane spirit.

The article closes with the hope that the young
Justice would "serve as a bridging influence within
the Court between the absolutist defenders of liberty and the sometimes unrestrained advocates of
37
self restraint.

It was this mediator, this negotiator, this voice
of reason that I came to know and hold in the
highest regard. While history will surely remember Justice Brennan as the voice of a Court that
tempered the excesses of authority, the legal community should also remember him as the preceptor of civility.
One need look only at one of his many dissents
to see the power of his civility and persuasion.
While it is not uncommon for a minority dissenter
to criticize the ruling of "the majority," Justice
Brennan instead refers magisterially to those in
the majority as "the Court."38 Moreover, Justice
Brennan had a collegial habit of noting points of
agreement with "the Court" before discussing his
criticisms." 39 Finally, and most importantly, Justice Brennan never manifested any element of acrimony in either his written opinions or his spo40
ken word.
In contrast to those who believe in the power of
"hardball," Justice Brennan succeeded in using
the tools of congeniality and rationality. Even
though Justice Brennan admitted that he "was
much happier when I wasn't writing as many dissents,"4 ' his reluctance to regress to impertinence
served him well. For example, his well-reasoned
dissenting opinions in General Electric Co. v. Gilbertt 2 and Grove City College v. Bell 43 influenced
44
Congressional action to adopt his position.

35

William v. Shannon.
11 CATH. U. L. Rrv. 3 (Jan., 1962).
Id. at 3-4.

Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the ImperativeJudicial Civility,
28 VAL. U.L. REv. 583 (Winter, 1994).
41
Kaplan, A Master Builder, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1990, at
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19, 20, quoted in Norman Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice William
Brennan,Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 15, 17 (Nov., 1990).
42 See generally 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
43 See generally 465 U. S. 555, 581 (1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
44 In Gilbert, the Court held that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy was outside of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988)).
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2096 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, k (1988)), it cited Justice Brennan's dissent which
asserted that the Court's opinion was incongruent with gen-
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See id. at 14.
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See Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan-An Appreciation, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 10 (Summer, 1991).
39
See id.
40
In fact, in an article commenting on judicial civility,
the most inflammatory language ascribed to Justice Brennan
37

was use of the term "wooden" to describe one of his col-

league's opinions. In an era when the high-water mark of
judicial incivility amounts to biting sarcasm and implied allegations of outright stupidity, a single use of the term
"wooden" during a thirty-four year tenure should stand as no
less than remarkable. See generally Edward McGlynn, Gaffney,
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So how can one sum up the career of this brilliant, compassionate, far-sighted advocate of our
freedom?
Judicially, his legacy has stood the test of time
and his work remains largely intact. Furthermore,
he lived to see the building of a "vital center" on
the current Court after his retirement from the
bench. In this sense, he fulfilled the expectations
of his contemporaries who reviewed his work after
a short five years on the Supreme Court.

Personally, this was a man who could have no
great regrets. His professional success, great as it
was, was exceeded by his personal integrity and
sense of fair dealing. This was a man who forged
relationships built on reason and compassion. He
was, and is, an archetype for the modem lawyer
and the modem man.

der discrimination jurisprudence. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983).

Stat. 28 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.

In Grove City, the Court held that an institution receiving
federal funds for one function could not be prevented from
discriminating in other areas. When Congress passed The
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102

and 42 U.S.C. (1988)), it adopted Justice Brennan's dissenting view in providing that no institution receiving federal
assistance in any amount may discriminate in any of its activities on the basis of race, sex, age or disability. See Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992).

